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Abstract 
Bayesian models of legal arguments generally aim to produce a single integrated 
model, combining each of the legal arguments under consideration. This combined 
approach implicitly assumes that variables and their relationships can be represented 
without any contradiction or misalignment, and in a way that makes sense with respect 
to the competing argument narratives. This paper describes a novel approach to 
compare and ‘average’ Bayesian models of legal arguments that have been built 
independently and with no attempt to make them consistent in terms of variables, 
causal assumptions or parameterization. The approach involves assessing whether 
competing models of legal arguments are explained or predict facts uncovered before 
or during the trial process. Those models that are more heavily disconfirmed by the 
facts are given lower weight, as model plausibility measures, in the Bayesian model 
comparison and averaging framework adopted. In this way a plurality of arguments is 
allowed yet a single judgement based on all arguments is possible and rational.  
1. Introduction 
Typically, Bayesian models of legal arguments have been developed with the aim of producing an 
integrated model which combines each of the legal arguments under consideration, such as those 
presented by the defence and prosecution in a trial [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. This approach 
implicitly assumes that the resulting integrated model can represent variables and their relationships 
without any contradiction or misalignment and in a way that makes sense with respect to the 
competing argument narratives. We call this approach to legal argumentation the “integrated Bayesian 
perspective” (see [8], for an account of the history and status of this research area). However, the 
integrated approach can be challenging in practice. By seeking to unify disparate arguments in a 
single consistent model we encounter modelling difficulties that are hard to overcome, such as those 
reported in [9] relating to the basic requirement of mutual exclusivity, and the requirement that 
conditional or causal dependencies remain consistent despite competing or contradictory argument 
narratives. Finally, the integrated approach assumes an omniscient fact-finder capable of rationally 
fusing all relevant information all at once when, in practice, the fact-finder is part of an evolving legal 
process that culminates in a decision.  
Whilst the integrated approach represents a noble ideal for determining the ‘true’ state of the world, 
we can find no practical requirement or legal stipulation to adopt the integrated approach and neither 
can we assume that, for any legal case, there are only ever two competing arguments requiring 
unification. Indeed, each party in a trial process may present more than one argument, each mutually 
exclusive of the other, positing different causal conjectures, assigning different weights to evidence or 
even ignoring some kinds of evidence altogether.   
Indeed, non-Bayesian approaches to legal argumentation have tended to be narrative-based with a 
focus on comparisons between competing stories and explanations with much less emphasis on formal 
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integration [2], [3], [4], [9]. Recent work that incorporates scenario-based approaches with Bayesian 
networks has attempted to partly address this problem [10], [11]. Likewise, a convincing attempt at 
integrating narrative and probabilistic perspectives has been presented in [12], with an emphasis on 
modelling more than mere evidence but also considering competing narratives, explanations and 
notions of credibility and resiliency. However, the main weakness in the approach taken in [12] is that 
it fails to offer a convincing and operational means to structure and compare competing narratives. 
More recent work [13], [14] has attempted to connect arguments, probability and scenarios-based 
approaches. 
This paper presents an approach to modelling legal arguments that maintains the separation of each 
legal argument in separate Bayesian network models (described in Section 3). This approach allows 
differences in the variable definitions and causal dependencies that each argument may contain. Thus, 
in principle, defence and prosecution models may contain different variables with radically different 
causal dependencies and dissimilar probability assignments. Additionally, the paper aims to be 
consistent with the hypothetico-deductive method in that more accurate empirical inferences made by 
one legal argument, rather than another competing legal argument, are given more weight. 
The overall objective of the approach proposed is to model legal decision-making from the 
perspective of an observer or fact-finder (such as a judge or jury member) who observes the different 
arguments and facts presented by both sides of a case. Such an observer will formulate prior beliefs 
about the integrity and coherence of the arguments and will then revise their beliefs after they observe 
witnesses present their evidence and defend it under cross-examination. The observer’s subsequent 
belief in the credibility of the witnesses will drive their revised belief in the credibility of the 
narratives.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes and motivates the underlying ideas and 
Section 3 summarises the Bayesian modelling approaches underpinning our framework. Section 4 
presents the proposed framework. In Section 5 we use an example to show how the framework might 
be applied as a trial develops. Section 6 presents an integrated model and discusses how it compares 
with the example results. Finally, in Section 7 we offer some discussion and then give conclusions in 
Section 8. 
2.  The underlying idea and its motivation 
The aim of our paper is to compare Bayesian models of legal arguments, even if they have been built 
independently and with no attempt to make them consistent in terms of variables, causal assumptions 
or parameterisation. We consider the situation in a criminal trial, where a suspect has been charged 
with some crime, and where prosecution and defence arguments each can be represented by a 
Bayesian model. Several facts (primary pieces of evidence), such as the results of forensic analysis 
and witness statements, have been established; but the weight, relevance and interpretation of those 
facts are disputed by the two sides. During court hearings, by cross-examination and argument, further 
evidence of secondary nature comes to light which we call source credibility evidence. This source 
credibility evidence may or may not change our judgement of source credibility. How reliable is a 
witness? What kinds of errors can be made when calling on forensic evidence? 
 
We suppose that the Bayesian model produced by each of the two parties allows them to express the 
arguments about both guilt and innocence of the defendant1. Each is a model of the joint probability 
distribution of several random variables: some of which are supposed to have been observed, others of 
which (“hidden variables") have not. The variables in the two models need not be the same since the 
two parties have different pictures of the causality relations between what is observed in the real 
                                               
1 Note that throughout this paper we use argument and model interchangeably, since we propose that each 
argument can be represented by a model. 
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world on the one hand, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the other hand. The model of 
the prosecution should somehow explain the facts by taking the defendant to be guilty, while the 
model of the prosecution is an explanation of the same facts by taking the defendant to be innocent. 
But the two models do not typically assume a priori guilt and innocence respectively. They might 
even contain the same a priori probabilities of guilt. Typically, prosecution and defence will both 
have arguments concerning motive and opportunity, which describe the situation in the real world at 
times prior to the crime, as well as arguments about forensic evidence, which typically bears on 
actions or events at the time of the crime. If the model of the prosecution deals with evidence for (i.e., 
facts relating to) motive and opportunity, then it must admit that absent those facts, innocence must 
have been a real possibility, hence it will implicitly imply a non-zero prior probability of innocence; 
by prior we mean prior to knowledge of the facts. The prosecution model is put forward to show that 
a posteriori, i.e., given the facts, innocence is highly unlikely. Conversely, the defence model is put 
forward to show that a posteriori, thus given the same facts, innocence is quite possible. 
 
Both models are in fact models for the joint probability distribution of guilt/innocence and the facts. 
They each define their own prior for guilt, as well as their own conditional probabilities for the facts 
given guilt or innocence. We consider a third party, the fact-finder, who has to evaluate the arguments 
of the two sides. This could be a judge, or judges' bench, or a jury, or an academic studying historical 
cases to model either actual or ideal behaviour of triers of fact. Whether our framework should be 
considered descriptive or prescriptive is left open. As we said, both models should allow guilt and 
innocence to be expressed within the model, and both models should allow us to express realisation or 
actualisation of certain facts. The various hidden variables in the two models model the causal 
relations between what can be observed in a way which is consistent with our understanding of “how 
the world works”.  
 
An argument that fails to explain any of the facts of the case or any supplementary facts that arise 
during the case should be believed less than an argument that successfully explains all facts. 
Therefore, arguments that do not explain facts should be penalised by the fact-finder. However, unlike 
in science where models are judged by how well they predict facts, here legal arguments are partly 
and initially “fitted” to the facts and thus do not have the status of scientific predictions. Nonetheless, 
some underlying operating conditions are shared between science and law: in a court case an 
argument is tested by cross examining witnesses. This process may reveal new, previously unknown, 
contradictory facts that discredit the sources used in an argument and hence undermine the argument 
itself. This process closely parallels scientific practice and so our view is to judge legal arguments in a 
scientific way based on how well they explain (historical) facts and how well they predict (new) facts 
revealed during the trial. Indeed, it has been cogently argued that the adversarial fact finding process, 
as practiced in England and Wales, shares the same Enlightenment values and methods of enquiry as 
the empirical scientific process [15]. 
 
We propose that the plausibility the fact-finder has in a model should be a function of how well it 
explains the facts of the case and by its ability to anticipate future facts, revealed during the case. We 
propose measuring plausibility as the joint probability that all facts are confirmed by a model. Under 
this framework a model that makes incorrect predictions would suffer penalty and a model that relies 
on too many auxiliary hypotheses and assumptions will be more fragile and easier to refute. There is 
persuasive evidence to support the idea that lay people think this way too [16]. 
 
Contradictions between hypotheses that attempt to explain old facts and new facts are mediated in our 
framework by the credibility the fact-finder places in the sources of those facts. If a source is 
discredited by new facts that contradict older ones, then those elements of the argument that rely on 
that source will be disbelieved. Hence, source credibility and observations (facts) about source 
credibility play a prominent role. Accordingly, the original Bayesian models produced by each party 
are enhanced by the fact-finder such that it reflects their own judgements about these factors. 
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3. Bayesian Inference methods applied 
There are two types of Bayesian inference in our framework. The first is Bayesian Model Comparison 
and Averaging (BMCA) and the second are Bayesian Networks (BNs). Bayes Theorem underpins 
both approaches and is a sufficiently good starting point to understand BMCA and BNs. Bayes 
Theorem states that the probability of a hypothesis variable, 𝐻 = ℎ𝑖, with 𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑛 states, given 
evidence variable, 𝐸, is: 
𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ𝑖  | 𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸 | 𝐻 = ℎ𝑖)𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ𝑖)
∑ 𝑃(𝐸 | 𝐻 = ℎ𝑖)𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (1) 
where: 𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ𝑖  | 𝐸) is the posterior probability of the hypothesis being true; 𝑃(𝐸 | 𝐻 = ℎ𝑖) is the 
likelihood of observing the evidence, 𝐸, given the hypothesis; 𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ𝑖) is the prior probability of 
the hypothesis being true; and 𝑃(𝐸) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐸 | 𝐻 = ℎ𝑖)𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the probability of observing 
the evidence over all hypotheses. 
BMCA is widely used to compare and average predictions, sourced from different models that, 
despite differences in content and accuracy, allow their combination using the same observed data 
[17], [18]. BMCA applies a standard norm of scientific investigation by identifying those models that 
predict or explain the available data, more or less well and weighs each model by the plausibility of 
their performance. Assuming we have several different models, each competing to explain and predict 
the same phenomena, the decision maker can then either select the ‘best’ model, or by producing an 
ensemble model, average all the model predictions, weighted by the performance of each. We can 
‘solve’ the BMCA problem using Bayes Theorem by replacing hypotheses with models, 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖, and 
evidence with data, 𝐷: 
𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖 | 𝐷) =
𝑃(𝐷 | 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖)𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖)
∑ 𝑃(𝐷 | 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖)𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2) 
where: 𝑃(𝐷 | 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖) is the likelihood of observing that data under model; 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖; and 𝑃(𝑀 =
𝑚𝑖) is the prior probability of the model being true. Assuming equal priors, those models with higher 
likelihood probabilities will have equivalently higher posterior probabilities. We can then select and 
use the most plausible model as being equal to the one with the highest posterior probability. 
Alternatively, we can average the resulting predictions for a given variable of interest, 𝜙, made by the 
ensemble of models: 
𝑃(𝜙 | 𝐷) = ∑ 𝑃(𝜙 | 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖, 𝐷)𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖 | 𝐷)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (3) 
where the posterior probability, 𝑃(𝜙 | 𝐷), is the average of the predictions sourced from each model 
and weighted by their performance using formula (2). 
A BN (also known as a graphical probabilistic model) is a Bayesian model that is composed of a 
graphical structure and a set of parameters. The graphical structure of a BN is a Directed Acyclic 
Graph (DAG). Each node of the DAG represents a random variable and each directed edge represents 
a relation between those variables. When one or more parent nodes are connected by a directed edge 
to a child node a set of probability assignments (the parameterization) is used to define their 
Conditional Probability Distribution (CPD). An example BN is the joint distribution 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷) =
𝑃(𝐷 | 𝐶)𝑃(𝐵 | 𝐴, 𝐶)𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐶), shown by Figure 1. Bayes theorem can then be applied to the DAG to 
query any probability from the model (e.g. 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐷 | 𝐶)𝑃(𝐵 | 𝐴, 𝐶)𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐶)𝐵,𝐷 ). 
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Figure 1 A simple 4 variable BN 
The DAG encodes conditional independence assertions between its variables. For example, a node is 
conditionally independent from the rest of the BN given that its parents, children and the parents of 
their children are observed (see [19] and [20] for more information on BNs and their conditional 
independence properties). The conditional independence assertions encoded in the DAG enables a BN 
to represent a complex joint probability distribution in a compact and factorized way. In some 
circumstances the DAG may be chosen to represent causal assertions connecting known and unknown 
events and the CPTs assigned may represent our subjective beliefs (probabilities) about these events. 
In Figure 1 the factorization 𝑃(𝐷 | 𝐶)𝑃(𝐵 | 𝐴, 𝐶)𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐶) may therefore be considered as assertion 
that variables 𝐴, 𝐶 jointly cause variable 𝐵, while 𝐷 is a consequence of 𝐶 alone. 
BNs have established inference algorithms that make exact and approximate inference computations 
by exploiting the conditional independence encoded in the structure. Popular exact algorithms, such as 
the Junction Tree algorithm [20], and available in commercial and free software packages, [21], 
provide efficient solutions computations for BNs with only discrete variables. 
4. Our Framework 
Our framework is a direct application of BCMA, stylised to fit a legal context. We assume legal 
arguments are represented by BN models whose outputs, in the form of plausibility probabilities and 
assessments of guilt/innocence, are used by BMCA to compare and average. For simplicity we 
assume there are two sides to the case, each presenting a single defence and a prosecution argument, 
where each of these can be represented by a single BN model. Yet, in practice more arguments may 
be ‘in play’.  
Denoting the two BN models respectively by 𝑚𝑃 and 𝑚𝐷, we shall take the Bayesian point of view 
that the fact-finder's uncertainty about which model is correct is expressed by prior probabilities. Note 
that the prior distribution over models is not the same as a prior distribution of guilt/innocence. 
 
The two sides' arguments each specify a joint probability distribution of a whole list of further 
variables, conditional on a random variable 𝑀 taking the value either 𝑚𝑃 or 𝑚𝐷. Two BN models for 
the defence and prosecution arguments are shown in Figure 2, for the example we will cover in detail 
in Section 5. 
 
The two lists of model variables can differ, but they do have some commonalities - after all, they are 
both models for the same case.  We will list those commonalities later, but first we make some 
remarks concerning notation. Here we adopt the notational convention that random variables are 
denoted by upper case letters, realised values of random variables are denoted with lower case letters. 
We take the Bayesian point of view that probabilities which depend on unknown parameters are just 
conditional probabilities. Hence, mathematically, unknown parameters are just unobserved values of 
random variables. We denote guilt by a Boolean variable 𝐺 (where 𝐺 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 represent innocence); 
we take the collection of observed facts to be 𝐹 = 𝑓. Furthermore, we denote by 𝐶 the collection of 
expressions of credibility of each source of observed facts, 𝐹 = 𝑓, where each variable in 𝐶 is simply 
the belief in the accuracy of a source of evidence. We can differentiate credibility in the two models 
respectively as  𝐶 = 𝐶𝑃 and 𝐶 = 𝐶𝐷. We can do the same for fact nodes such that we have 𝐹 = 𝐹𝑃 
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and 𝐹 = 𝐹𝐷 because models may agree on some facts but not on others. Likewise, a fact variable may 
be agreed by both sides or presented by one side but unchallenged by the other, and hence have no 
associated credibility variable in one or both models. 
 
Both models must include variable 𝐺 and collections of variables 𝐹, 𝐶 and ranging over the same 
possible values. But everything else can be different. Prosecution and defence agree on the facts, but 
they disagree on their meaning and interpretation in numerous ways: they have different 
understandings of how the facts are causally related to guilt/innocence, both qualitatively (DAGs) and 
quantitatively (CPTs); different hidden variables can be involved; and finally, they have different a 
priori positions concerning the reliability of different sources of evidence, but ultimately it is the fact-
finder’s assessment of these that is pre-eminent. 
 
 
Figure 2 Initial prosecution, 𝑚𝑃, and defence models, 𝑚𝐷 
Marginalizing over the hidden variables, the prosecution's Bayesian model determines a joint 
probability distribution of (𝐺, 𝐹, 𝐶) conditional on 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑃. Similarly, the defence's model determines 
a joint probability distribution of (𝐺, 𝐹, 𝐶) conditional on 𝑀 = 𝑚𝐷. Together with a prior distribution 
of M this gives us a joint probability distribution of (𝑀, 𝐺, 𝐹, 𝐶). 
 
The prosecution believes that 𝐶 = 𝐶𝑃 and the defence believes that 𝐶 = 𝐶𝐷. Each believes that their 
own model is correct, conditioned on the facts and the credibility of the sources of these facts. They 
then assert that the defendant is guilty or innocent, respectively, because: 
 
(prosecution)  𝑃(𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦 |𝐹 = 𝑓, 𝐶 = 𝐶𝑃 , 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑃) is large (4) 
(defence)  𝑃(𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦 |𝐹 = 𝑓, 𝐶 = 𝐶𝐷 , 𝑀 = 𝑚𝐷) is small (5) 
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The court hearings allow the fact-finder to get their own opinion as to the value of 𝐶. We suppose that 
this opinion is summarised by a definitive understanding that 𝐶 = 𝑐. We furthermore define model 
plausibility as the probability of observing the facts given model 𝑚 is true, the credibility of the 
sources of those facts, conditioned on the model conclusion made by each party (guilt or innocence): 
 
(prosecution)  𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓 | 𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦, 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑃) (6) 
(defence) 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓 | 𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = ¬𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦, 𝑀 = 𝑚𝐷) (7) 
 
The model plausibility “belongs” to the fact-finder - the party who must make assessments of the 
likelihood that 𝐹 = 𝑓. 
 
From now on we will abuse notation in the conventional way by rewriting model plausibility as: 
 
𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓 |𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = 𝑔, 𝑀 = 𝑚) = 𝑝𝐹|𝐶,𝑀(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚) = 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚) (8) 
Using the definition of conditional probability, we obtain the following result2: 
𝑝(𝑚 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) =
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)
∑ 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚′)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚′)𝑝(𝑚′)𝑚′
 (9) 
Which shows how model plausibility, 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓), impacts on our posterior belief in which model is 
true, 𝑝(𝑚 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓). Moreover, model plausibility also enters our posterior belief in guilt or innocence 
(writing 𝑔  for the value ‘guilty’ of the variable 𝐺), resulting in the theorem: 
𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑐, 𝑓) =
∑ 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑐, 𝑓, 𝑚)𝑝(𝑚 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓)𝑚
∑ 𝑝(𝑚 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓)𝑚
=
∑ 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑐, 𝑓, 𝑚)𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)𝑚
∑ 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 |𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)𝑚
(10)  
Essentially, the court proceedings might well give the fact-finder more insights into the two models. 
Can the assumed causal structures be taken seriously, along with all their hidden variables; are the 
accompanying causal relations acceptable? It seems to us that the court proceedings could lead the 
fact-finder to wish to adjust the two models or to re-evaluate the prior over the two models. More 
seriously still, the fact-finder might conclude that, even after such modifications, neither model can be 
accepted. If the two possibilities are not exhaustive, then a probability of guilt given that just one of 
the two is true could be terribly misleading; we will return to this issue later in Section 5. Also, note 
that the prior distribution over the two models is not the same as the prior probability of guilt or 
innocence. It is rather some kind of meta-prior: the subjective prior probability that one or the other of 
two whole complexes of arguments is correct. That makes it all the harder to evaluate, and more likely 
that further analysis could reveal large inadequacies of both models. Significant differences between 
assumptions about causal structure could make clear that different aspects of both models must be 
rejected. The scientific method tells us to reject models which make false predictions, but it does not 
tell us how to amend the models when that happens, and Bayesian methodology is not much help 
here. These and other open questions are revisited at the end of the paper. 
Our framework makes use of the evidence accuracy idiom described in [4], which represents how a 
fact-finder reasons about evidence reliant on the credibility of a source providing that evidence. It is 
implemented as a BN to distinguish between the truth of a hypothesis (such as whether some event 
happened or not) and the source (such as a witness) that provides evidence about the hypothesis 
                                               
2 For simplicity we use a simple conditioning here, but each model might be represented by different 
conditioning assumptions. Likewise, to simplify the presentation we have also dropped other variables, such as 
those representing unknown hypotheses. 
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(which could be direct, such as asserting that the hypothesis is true, or indirect such as making an 
assertion which supports the hypothesis). Figure 3 presents the basic BN form of this idiom. 
 
Figure 3 Model showing evidence accuracy idiom 
The extent to which the fact-finder can infer the truth of the hypothesis from the source assertion 
obviously depends on the source credibility. If the source is credible then their evidence will increase 
the fact-finder’s belief in the hypothesis being true; if the source is discredited, then their testimony 
will have little or no impact on the fact-finder’s belief in the hypothesis. In practice, the evidence 
about source credibility might take the form of oral contradictions, obfuscations, untruths or physical 
or emotional displays that are taken to betray the credibility of the source; or impeccable credentials 
and cogent reasoning that make them believable. Evidence about source credibility generally does not 
fix the values of source credibility nodes. Such evidence (together with the facts 𝐹 = 𝑓) only update 
the prior distributions over their values within each of the prosecution and defence models. This is the 
sense in which the two sets of variables may be collapsed together; however, it usually will not allow 
us to instantiate 𝐶 (with certainty) for both models simultaneously. We can simply consider evidence 
about source credibility as “just another kind of evidence”, i.e., we add it to the facts 𝐹. The 
credibility variables 𝐶 become “hidden variables”. We just have two models for the joint distribution 
of 𝐹 and 𝐺, and a prior over the models; both models include many “hidden variables”, including the 
credibility sources. They are used to express the causal relations between what is observed. We 
compute the posterior probabilities of the models, and the posterior probability of guilt, using even 
simpler versions of the earlier formulas, for instance: 
𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓) =
∑ 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓, 𝑚)𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)𝑚
∑ 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)𝑚
 (11)  
What has become more complex is that 𝑓 now stands for the combination of evidence obtained prior 
to the trial and evidence obtained during the trial. If one is interested, one can look at posterior 
probabilities of source credibility given the evidence 𝑓. This makes sense given both prosecution and 
defence models contain the same source credibility nodes in the sense that the probabilities 𝑃(𝐶 =
𝑐 | 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑖) are well defined in each model 𝑚. Indeed, given it is the fact-finder who is judging 
credibility then it should be the same in each model. If the evidence 𝑓 consists of two parts (𝑓1, 𝑓2), 
one can also use the same formula iteratively, first updating the prior using the information (𝐹1 = 𝑓1), 
and then updating the “intermediate posterior” using the information (𝐹2 = 𝑓2). This is, of course, 
equivalent to using the earlier formula 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑐, 𝑓), where the two steps are combined into one. 
The defence model might only deal with a subset of the facts. The same can be true for the 
prosecution. Nor are either side required to challenge the credibility of sources by cross examination. 
In Bayesian terms this means that a model 𝑚 is a model for some part 𝐹𝑚 = 𝑓𝑚 of the facts. We can 
write ?̅?𝑚 for the remaining facts, the overline standing for “complement”. In this circumstance some 
variables in a model will be causally disconnected from those others playing a full role in the legal 
argument. But the defence or prosecution may not just be ignoring ?̅?𝑚 = 𝑓?̅?, they may claim 
irrelevance, which in strict Bayesian terms translates into conditional independence: the defence 
model might claim independence of the event part ?̅?𝑚 = 𝑓?̅? given innocence and given 𝐹𝑚 = 𝑓𝑚. The 
problem is that defining a position on the value of the conditional probabilities for these “ignored 
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facts” is difficult if they are irrelevant.  As we saw from (7), we do need the values of 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑚) for 
both models 𝑚, where 𝑓 = (𝑓𝑚, 𝑓?̅?) is the combination of all facts, so we cannot simply drop facts 
from one model but keep them in the other. One solution is to allow the fact-finder to consider the 
relevance of an ignored fact to a model, either by adjusting the prior belief in the model or by 
assigning a probability distribution to each ignored fact. If judged genuinely irrelevant, a non-
informative distribution might be assigned to each ignored fact, resulting in 𝑝(𝑓?̅? | 𝑚) equaling one 
half to the power of the number of ignored facts nodes, the dimension of 𝐹𝑚. That way, ignoring more 
facts becomes more heavily penalised. This has the side effect of allowing us to compute the 
probability of a model making a random guess of the facts, thus providing a baseline. On the other 
hand, some facts may be ignored for legitimate reasons, and thus may be assigned higher or lower 
probability, conditional on background knowledge. In these ways ignored facts play a crucial role in 
our framework. 
In law, the defence is not obliged to come up with a complete scenario dealing thoroughly with all 
facts brought to the case. As we have said the defence's position might well be that the accused is 
innocent, and certain facts are simply quite irrelevant. Therefore, the fact-finder should be allowed 
flexibility to deal with what we call “silent facts”. Silent facts may represent a deliberate strategy to 
avoid self-incrimination, or, alternatively, where the defendant simply has not had access to the 
resources or time needed to muster a credible counter argument to explain these facts. Likewise, there 
may be suspicion that the prosecution might be suppressing evidence to help secure a conviction. 
These reasons serve to “explain away” ignored facts in a model which, although they may be missing 
from the argument made, are nevertheless very informative. We suggest handling this by allowing the 
fact-finder to construct explanations for ignored facts that reflect their beliefs about the reasons for 
silence i.e. they explain them away by extending the causal model. 
Of course, during a court case, or indeed during the process of investigation, arguments do not remain 
static. They change as defence and prosecution react to new evidence. At its most basic we can 
consider two kinds of narratives: the story of the crime (and its investigation) and the story of the 
court case [22], [23]. In one we have causal conjectures about what happened and in the other we deal 
with causal conjectures that seek to undermine or support the first. In the latter the timing of the 
presentation of evidence, as well as the type and strength of evidence, can be crucial in testing the 
causal narrative about the crime. For instance, an advocate may keep some information back for cross 
examination in order to unbalance a witness or they may call a witness who presents ‘surprising’ 
testimony that may overturn the opposing case [24]. Similarly, at various stages in the legal process 
one party may be privy to information not available to the other. This information asymmetry is 
rightly considered unfair in most legal jurisdictions and in such cases all information must be 
disclosed to all parties. Interestingly, this unfairness property is mimicked in Bayes’ because we 
cannot carry out Bayesian model comparison if the models are being compared against different data. 
So, in this way Bayes theorem enforces the legal requirement of fairness. It is our intention that our 
framework be flexible enough to deal with dynamic shifts in the case and asymmetry. 
As a final word it should be clear that, in practice, each legal argument will be constructed 
independently and with different objectives in mind, and so there is no guarantee that the variables 
and states specified in one are identical or consistent with those presented in another. An example 
where this is obvious occurs when a prosecutor may define the variable for guilt, 𝐺, as having 
mutually exclusive states {𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟, ¬𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟} whilst the defence might specify the variable 
innocent, 𝐼, with mutually exclusive states {𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒, 𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟}. Here ¬𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 includes the 
possibility of an accident, a state that cannot even be recognised in the defence model since this model 
admits only two events and neither of which includes accident. Therefore, whilst it cannot be 
practically guaranteed that variable definitions are uniform and standardized across arguments, we 
assume that the fact-finder is able to impose some uniformity at least for the purposes of applying this 
framework. 
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5. Applying the framework to an example 
To illustrate the framework, consider the following hypothetical case:  
A victim is known to have been murdered. A defendant is accused of the murder. The 
prosecution argument is based on these facts  
 the defendant previously threatened to kill the victim, and this was witnessed 
 an eyewitness who claims to have been at the crime scene and asserts to having seen 
the defendant kill the victim  
 a forensic expert witness asserts that DNA collected from the crime scene matches 
that of the defendant.  
While the defence is silent on the fact that the defendant previously threatened the victim and 
has no comment on the eyewitness statement, their argument is based on the claim that the 
defendant was not at the scene of the crime at the time – a claim supported by the defendant’s 
partner who asserts that she was in a cinema with him at the time of the crime. Also, the 
defence claim that the victim and the defendant were friends (and hence there was no motive) 
These initial arguments may be those represented in the prosecution and defence opening statements. 
The BN models representing the fact-finder’s understanding of these prosecution and defence 
arguments is shown in Figure 2, along with a legend showing the different types of nodes used. The 
CPTs for the example are listed in the Appendix; note that this includes the prior values for the 
credibility nodes which are never instantiated directly with evidence. 
The facts, 𝑓, of the prosecution model, 𝑚𝑃, are: 
 “Forensic witness asserts DNA collected from scene” = True 
 “Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant” = True 
 “Eye witness says they saw defendant attack victim” = True 
 “Witness claims that defendant previously threatened them” = True 
The facts, 𝑓, the defence model, 𝑚𝐷 , are:  
 “Defendant partner says he was with her in cinema” = True  
 “Witness claims that defendant friends with victim” = True. 
Notice that the defence makes no attempt to explain several facts that support the prosecution model. 
Also, the prosecution does not include the two defence facts. Hence, both models (implicitly) contain 
ignored facts. These are ignored facts in our framework. Also, notice that the fact “Defendant friends 
with victim” = True does not have an associated credibility source variable. This is because this fact is 
introduced in the defence argument but never addressed nor challenged by the prosecution, hence any 
judgement about source credibility is unnecessary in either model. 
Let’s assume the fact-finder decides to weigh the models according to how well they explain the facts 
of the case, giving higher weight to the prosecution model: 𝑝(𝑚𝑃) = 0.8, 𝑝(𝑚𝐷) = 0.2. Let’s also 
assume that the fact-finder assigns their own prior beliefs in the source credibility variables, 𝐶 = 𝑐 , as 
given in the Appendix. 
The facts observed, 𝑓, update the fact-finder’s source credibility variables to provide new posterior 
beliefs that then affect the inference of 𝐺 in each model. By executing the models we compute the 
marginal probability of guilt directly from the guilt node, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒), named: “Defendant 
killed the victim”, conditioned on the facts: 𝑝(𝑔 |𝑐, 𝑓, 𝑚𝑃) =  0.999, 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑐, 𝑓, 𝑚𝐷) =  0.0014. As 
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expected, the fact-finder’s perceives that the prosecution argument is very certain of guilt and the 
defence argument is convinced of innocence. 
Under our framework we first measure the plausibility the fact-finder should have in each model. This 
is the joint probability of all facts given the model, assuming guilt or innocence respectively. For the 
prosecution the plausibility is the probability of the joint event: {“Forensic witness asserts DNA 
collected from scene” = True, “Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant” = True, 
“Eye witness says they saw defendant attack victim” = True, “Defendant previously threatened 
witness” = True, “Defendant partner says he was with her in cinema” = True, “Defendant friends with 
victim” = True} conditioned on  𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦. For the defence it is the same joint event conditioned on 
, 𝐺 = ¬𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦. Here we assume the fact-finder is happy to assign non-informative distributions to the 
ignored facts. Putting these observations into our model and equations (6) and (7) gives us: 
(prosecution)  𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓 | 𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦, 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑃) = 0.330 
(defence) 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓 | 𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = ¬𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦, 𝑀 = 𝑚𝐷) = 0.050 
Therefore, the probability of the prosecution argument explaining the facts is 0.33 and for the defence 
is 0.05. A random assignment of truth values to the facts would yield 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓) = 1 2⁄ 6 =
0.015625, so the prosecution model is significantly better than a guess, but the defence model less so. 
The plausibility of the defence model is low because of the number of ignored facts in the model: had 
more facts been explained the plausibility would have been higher. 
We now put the model priors and the plausibility probabilities into Equation (6), yielding these 
posterior beliefs in each model:  
𝑝(𝑚𝑃 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) =
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑚𝑃)
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑚𝑃) + 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑚𝐷)
=  
0.330(0.8)
0.050(0.2) + 0.330(0.8)
= 0.964  
𝑝(𝑚𝐷 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) =
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑚𝐷)
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑚𝑃) + 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑚𝐷)
=  
0.050(0.2)
0.050(0.2) + 0.330(0.8)
= 0.036 
So, at the opening of the trial the fact-finder already believes the prosecution model is better at 
explaining the facts of the case. Next, we need to calculate the probability of guilt given the two 
models, using equation (10): 
𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓) =
∑ 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓, 𝑚)𝑝(𝑚 | 𝑓)𝑚
∑ 𝑝(𝑚 | 𝑓)𝑚
=
𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓, 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑚𝐷 | 𝑓) + 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓, 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑚𝑃 | 𝑓)
𝑝(𝑚𝐷 | 𝑓) + 𝑝(𝑚𝑃 | 𝑓)
=
0.0367(0.0014) + 0.964(0.999)
0.0367 + 0.964
= 0.962 
For the fact-finder, the probability of guilt is 0.962 based on their plausibility in the two models, the 
credibility of the sources of evidence, the facts presented, and the causal and probabilistic 
assumptions made in each model. 
Our framework has successfully combined two models with different assumptions and produced a 
single assessment, belonging to the fact-finder, in a way that gives greater weight to the model that 
explains the facts better. Of course, we also wish to model the dynamic nature of an evolving case, 
especially using new facts gained during the cross-examination process. As a last step let’s now 
assume that a cross examination has taken place and new supplementary facts have been discovered: 
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The defendant is much more likely to have left DNA at the scene than the prosecution assumes 
because the defendant was a frequent visitor to the scene of the crime in a way that is 
consistent with the DNA findings. 
During the defence witness cross examination, she claims her partner would have shown up 
on the cinema’s CCTV system. It turns out the police had collected the CCTV video but not 
made it available to the defence. Subsequently it was made available to the court, and despite 
not being of high quality, the fact-finder believed it showed someone matching the accused 
description at the cinema at the time of the crime. 
It is revealed by the eye witness that she failed to pick out the defendant on an identity parade 
Finally, under cross examination the character witness admitted to being in a rival gang. 
The new source credibility evidence facts, 𝑓2, to add to the initial facts in the models, 𝑓1, are: 
 “CCTV from camera corroborates description” = True 
  “Identity parade failure” = True 
 “Character witness in rival gang” = True 
These new facts lead to newly revised models as shown in Figure 43. In the defence model the facts 
from the forensic witness do not imply guilt and the CPT for the variable “Defendant left DNA at the 
scene” assumes it is just as likely to be DNA at the scene if the defendant murdered the victim or not. 
Crucially, two facts are now no longer ignored in the defence model: “Forensic witness asserts DNA 
collected from scene” = True and “Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant” = True. 
Likewise, in the prosecution model the evidence “CCTV from camera corroborates description” = 
True is judged by the fact-finder to be so remote, within the context of the prosecution scenario, that it 
is assigned a probability value of 0.001: perhaps not unreasonable, given the evidence was supressed. 
 
                                               
3 Note that Figure 4 shows two separate BN models, but the underlying computation uses one model. This is 
because we need to ensure the probabilities computed for the source credibility variables are identical and 
consistent in each model. So, during computation we combine credibility variables to enable us to produce a 
single model containing two sub-models linked to a single common collection of credibility nodes belonging to 
the fact-finder. 
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Figure 4 Revised prosecution, 𝑚𝑃, and defence models, 𝑚𝐷 
In both models, the probability of guilt, conditioned on the facts and fact-finder’s beliefs about source 
credibility, has not changed significantly: 𝑝(𝑔 |𝑐, 𝑓, 𝑚𝑃) =  0.96362, 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑐, 𝑓, 𝑚𝐷) =  0.000271. 
We can now update the relevant probabilities for equation (6) and (7) to give: 
 (prosecution)  𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓 | 𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦, 𝑀 = 𝑚𝑃) = 0.00001 
(defence) 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓 | 𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = ¬𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦, 𝑀 = 𝑚𝐷) = 0.091 
We can now see that the fact-finder’s plausibility in the prosecution model has collapsed from 0.33 to 
0.00001. Their plausibility in the defence model has increased by a factor of two, from 0.05 to 0.091. 
Equations (9) and (10) now give: 
𝑝(𝑚𝑃 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) =
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑚𝑃)
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑚𝑃) + 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔 | 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑚𝐷)
=  
0.00001(0.8)
0.091(0.2) + 0.00001(0.8)
= 4.38𝐸 − 5 
𝑝(𝑚𝐷 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) =
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑚𝐷)
𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑚𝑃) + 𝑝(𝑓 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑚𝐷)
=  
0.091(0.2)
0.091(0.2) + 0.00001(0.8)
= 0.999956 
Thus, the posterior belief in the defence model has risen dramatically from 0.036 to 0.999956 and the 
posterior belief in the prosecution model has decreased to 4.38𝐸 − 5 from 0.964. 
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Also, the probability of guilt for the defence model has changed slightly to 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑐, 𝑓, 𝑚𝐷) =  0.0027 
given the new causal structure in the model. The new probability of guilt using equation (10) is: 
𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓) =
∑ 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓, 𝑚)𝑝(𝑚 |𝑓)𝑚
∑ 𝑝(𝑚 | 𝑓)𝑚
=
𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓, 𝑚𝐷)𝑝(𝑚𝐷 | 𝑓) + 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓, 𝑚𝑃)𝑝(𝑚𝑃 | 𝑓)
𝑝(𝑚𝐷 | 𝑓) + 𝑝(𝑚𝑃 | 𝑓)
=
0.000271 (0.999956) + 0.96362(4.38𝐸 − 5)
0.999956 + 4.38𝐸 − 5
= 0.000313 
So, by now explaining the DNA facts and providing damning evidence that cannot be explained by 
the prosecution, the fact-finder’s revised conclusion would dramatically change from 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓) =
0.962 to 𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑓) = 0.000313. Note this would be a change in the fact-finder’s belief rather than that 
of the advocates. 
6. Comparison with an integrated Bayesian model 
Here we present a Bayesian integrated model developed from our example, using all the information 
available to the fact-finder up to and including the final step in our example. This integrated model is 
shown in Figure 5. 
Combining the prosecution and defence arguments requires the fact-finder to merge the models using 
established methods [4], [6]. Three distinct parametric differences that arise from the models in our 
example are important and it is worth focusing on how these affect the integrated model: 
 The defence argument makes distinctly different assumptions about the prior motive of the 
defendant from that made by the prosecution. 
 The assumptions made about the hypothesis variable “DNA left at the scene” differ 
 The treatment of ‘ignored facts’ differs in each model 
These differences are reflected in different CPT tables in each model, as listed in the Appendix.  They 
also have an impact on the structure of the integrated model – the model now must accommodate 
distinct and mutually exclusive sets of assumptions and these are defence or prosecution model 
dependant. This dependency is represented by explicitly including several conditioning nodes that act 
as “switches” to switch prosecution or defence scenarios on or off. This strategy is investigated in 
[11], [25] but without emphasis on model integration. In Figure 5 these scenario nodes are shown as 
the rectangular nodes “Model scene assumption”, to represent different assumptions about the past 
frequency of the defendant visiting the scene, and “Model motive assumption”, to represent different 
assumptions for motive. The third issue relating to how ‘ignored facts’ are treated also has a 
significant structural effect on the model, because, again, for each argument the CPTs and 
conditioning changes. This can is accommodated by the scenario node “Model ignored facts” in the 
integrated model.  Each of these scenario switch nodes is then ultimately conditionally dependent on a 
“Models” variable with mutually exclusive states 𝑀 = {𝑚𝑃 , 𝑚𝐷} (this node replaces the “meta prior” 
used in the framework). 
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Figure 5 Integrated Bayesian model (model scenario and ignored fact variables are shown as 
rectangles) 
Obviously, armed with the integrated model we can answer how likely the facts are given the model, 
and we can infer the belief in the model given the facts and the belief in guilt. Assuming the same 
prior as before, 𝑝(𝑀 = 𝑚𝑃) = 0.8, 𝑝(𝑀 = 𝑚𝐷) = 0.2, from the integrated model this is simply 
calculated by normal BN propagation to give: 
𝑝(𝑀 = 𝑚𝑃 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) =  0.002397 
𝑝(𝑀 = 𝑚𝐷 | 𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) = 0.997603 
With the result for 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦: 
𝑝(𝑔 | 𝑐, 𝑓, 𝑀) = 0.002849 
This result looks directly comparable to the result calculated using our framework, giving us some 
comfort. However, we have argued that it is worthwhile to keep models separate for several reasons: 
our framework can tolerate differences in causal structure, disagreements of parameterisation and also 
a difference in the prior beliefs in the arguments. In contrast, from this integrationist example we can 
see that whilst integration can be enabled using scenario nodes (thus treating a single model as a 
mixture of different models) this comes at a cost in model legibility and malleability. Also, we would 
need to add scenario nodes for differences in causal structure and it is a considerable challenge to do 
this. 
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7. Discussion 
The framework we have described assumes that exactly one of the two models put forward by 
prosecution and defence is true. However, in criminal law this may be unrealistic as the fact-finder 
may come to entertain other pictures of how the world works beyond those initially put forward by 
defence and prosecution. The fact-finder may arrive at their own picture of how facts in the case are 
related, and it may well combine some elements of both parties’ explanations of the facts, and at the 
same time reject other elements of both parties’ explanations. In other words: the fact-finder is free 
to come up with an integrated model which, in effect, contradicts both models initially brought to the 
court by the two parties. In some legal jurisdictions this ‘freewheeling’ approach may present a 
problem in that the fact-finder may arrive at conclusions independently of the evidence, arguments 
and cross examinations related to the case. Indeed, given the way the jury system operates in Anglo-
Saxon countries this can and does occur. 
A second weakness is that the approach gives little guidance on how to choose the prior distribution 
over the two models. Because the approach is an unashamed subjective Bayesian approach, the initial 
probabilities of the two models are subjective or personal probabilities. They are the personal 
probabilities of the fact-finder. They represent the fact-finder’s prior beliefs about the integrity and 
coherence of the arguments which have been presented by the two parties: they “reflect judgements 
the fact-finder might make about the global rationality of the argument”.  Crucially, they do not 
represent the fact-finder’s prior beliefs in guilt or innocence. However, more than just global 
rationality needs to be evaluated. How is a fact-finder to quantify their prior relative degree of 
plausibility in the two pictures of the world provided by the two parties in the case? These two 
pictures are actually very detailed; they consist of more than just an attempt to express rational 
knowledge about what depends on what in graphical form. They also entail strengths of dependence 
in precise quantitative form. An outline sketch is transformed into an oil-painting. Also, any 
remaining uncertainties are quantified and expressed in terms of probability distributions representing, 
hopefully, rational degrees of belief in different possible values. 
Moreover, trial proceedings could well lead to dissatisfaction with both models, even if the 
prosecution model was significantly more plausible than the defence model. This makes computation 
of posterior probabilities conditional on just one of the two quite meaningless. In our framework we 
allow the fact-finder to revise the prior distribution of the two models, as well as their parameters, but 
there is not a formal (Bayesian or other) way to do this. If the fact-finder truly is trying to identify the 
true facts of the matter, flexibility and creativity is required. Even if the fact-finder is merely an 
adjudicator between two fixed points of view, Bayesian thinking cannot tell the fact-finder how to 
weigh two “wrong arguments”.  It seems to us that many miscarriages of justice, both in jurisdictions 
in the adversarial tradition and those in the inquisitorial tradition, have been caused by uncritical 
acceptance of badly flawed models, even when the defects of those models were explicitly brought to 
the attention of the court. Subjective confidence in expert evidence can easily depend more on the 
showmanship of the expert and the simplicity of the expert's message, than on the actual content of 
the expert's evidence. Similarly, the subjective prior probability of a model could be influenced by the 
model's simplicity even though it contains logical inconsistencies. We hope our framework might help 
in analysing such cases. 
We recommend our approach as a basis for investigating issues in the comparison of incomparable 
Bayesian models of legal incompatible arguments; this is, in essence, the problem facing a fact-finder 
in a criminal case. We do not claim to provide a fool-proof solution. No one does. In the inquisitorial 
approach the fact-finder is a truth seeker and may creatively generate new models. In the adversarial 
approach the fact-finder is a referee and is under no obligation to generate new models. One option 
would be to extend our framework to add a third model, a kind of default model, where the fact-finder 
should allocate some prior probability to a model in which the accused is “not proven guilty or 
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innocent" (the Scottish model). Inconsistencies in the prosecution and defence models could lead to 
an increase in the prior probability of this third model. Court hearings can reveal inconsistencies in the 
argument of the prosecution so large, that the prior probability of the default innocence model should 
increase. Whether or not the defence arguments are reasonable should then become irrelevant. The 
third, default model, takes over. The subjective Bayesian prior over the models could then only be 
decided after the court proceedings, not in advance; especially if we allow the parties to modify their 
models as the trial proceeds. 
Clearly what we have proposed is a theoretical framework; while the working example we provided 
demonstrates that it can be applied in a non-trivial case, we accept that this is very far from being any 
kind of serious validation of its practicality or usefulness. We hope that such validation will be the 
subject of future research. 
8. Conclusions 
In previous approaches Bayesian models of legal arguments have been developed with the aim of 
producing a single integrated model, combining each of the legal arguments under consideration. This 
combined approach implicitly assumes that variables and their relationships can be represented 
without any contradiction or misalignment and in a way that makes sense with respect to the 
competing argument narratives. Rather than aim to integrate arguments into a single model, this paper 
has described a novel approach to compare and ‘average’ Bayesian models of legal arguments that 
have been built independently and with no attempt to make them consistent in terms of variables, 
causal assumptions or parameterization. 
In our framework competing models of legal arguments are assessed by the extent to which the facts 
reported are confirmed or disconfirmed in court, as judged by the fact-finder. Those models that are 
more heavily disconfirmed are assigned lower weights, as model plausibility measures, in the 
Bayesian model comparison and averaging approach adopted. We have presented a simple example to 
describe the ideas and method and contrasted it with an equivalent integrated Bayesian model. 
We believe that our framework approach borrows strengths from the Bayesian and non-Bayesian 
narrative approaches to legal argumentation without introducing any new significant weaknesses. We 
would suggest that our approach might be more consistent with legal practice, where plurality in 
arguments is crucial, yet it does so in a novel way that views elements of the legal process as one 
consistent with empirical scientific methodology. 
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Appendix 
 
CPTs for Prosecution BN model at initial stage 
Defendant had motive, Defendant partner says he was with her in cinema (ignored fact), Defendant 
friends with victim (ignored fact) 
 
Character witness credibility, Eye witness credibility, Forensic witness credibility 
 
Defendant previously threatened witness | Character witness credibility, Defendant had motive 
  
Defendant killed the victim | Defendant had motive 
 
Eye witness says they saw defendant attack victim | Defendant killed the victim, Eye witness 
credibility 
 
Defendant left DNA at scene | Defendant killed the victim 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant | Forensic witness credibility, Defendant left 
DNA at scene 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA was collected from scene | Forensic witness credibility, Defendant left 
DNA at scene 
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CPTs for Defence BN model at initial stage 
Defendant had motive 
 
Defendant friends with victim | Defendant had motive 
 
Partner credibility 
 
Defendant killed the victim | Defendant had motive 
 
Defendant partner says he was with her in cinema | Partner credibility, Defendant killed the victim 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant (ignored fact), Forensic witness asserts DNA 
was collected from scene (ignored fact), Eye witness says they saw defendant attack victim (ignored 
fact), Defendant previously threatened witness (ignored fact) 
 
New CPTs for Prosecution BN model at revision stage 
CCTV from cinema corroborates description (ignored fact) 
 
Character witness in rival gang | Character witness credibility 
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Identity parade fail | Eye witness credibility 
 
New CPTs for Defence BN model at revision stage 
Character witness in rival gang | Character witness credibility 
 
Identity parade fail | Eye witness credibility 
 
CCTV from cinema corroborates description | Partner credibility 
 
Defendant left DNA at scene | Defendant killed the victim 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant | Forensic witness credibility, Defendant left 
DNA at scene 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA was collected from scene | Forensic witness credibility, Defendant left 
DNA at scene 
 
 
